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Abstract
We explain the notion of security architecture for Internet of Things (IoT) based on software-deﬁned networking (SDN). In this
context, the SDN-based architecture works with or without infrastructure, that we call SDN-Domain. This work describes the
operation of the proposed architecture and summarizes the opportunity to achieve network security in a more eﬃcient and ﬂexible
with SDN. An overview of existing SDN security applications were discussed and tackles its issues, presenting a new IoT system’s
architecture. In this paper we considered the network access control and global traﬃc monitoring for ad-hoc networks. Finally, we
point out architectural design choices for SDN using OpenFlow and discuss their performance implications.
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1. Introduction
Internet is growing rapidly in the last decades and continues to develop in terms of dimension and complexity. At
the end of 2014, 42.3% of the world population was connected to the network1. Nevertheless, the network security
threats increase with internet evolution. A special concern will be dedicated to the security of the Internet of Things
(IoT), since it will include every object or device with networking capabilities. Objects can include simple home
sensors, medical devices, cars, airplanes and even nuclear reactors and other things, which can pose risks to human
life. The number of breaches in 2013 was 62% percent greater than in 20122.
Traditional security mechanisms like Firewalling, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems are deployed at the
Internet edge. Those mechanisms are used to protect the network from external attacks. Such mechanisms are no
longer enough to secure the next generation Internet. The borderless architecture of the IoT raises additional concerns
over network access control and software veriﬁcation. In4, the authors present details of network access control
implementation based for IoT devices named as (PANATIKI).
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Recent advances in computer networking have introduced a new technology paradigm for future communication,
the Software Deﬁned Networks (SDN). A central software program, called SDN controller, manages the overall
network behavior. Into SDN the control and data planes are decoupled, network intelligence is logically centralized.
The controller can add, update, and delete ﬂow entries, both reactively in response to packets and proactively with
predeﬁned rules. In addition, SDN enables fast reaction to security threats, granular traﬃc ﬁltering, and dynamic
security policies deployment.
Based on the SDN architectures we propose a security model for the IoT. Firstly, the proposed security model was
designed to establish and secure both wired and wireless network infrastructure. Secondly, we extended the proposed
architecture in order to include Ad-Hoc networks and network object things such as: sensors, tablets, smart phones,
etc. Our main contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst eﬀort that uses the SDN architecture to tackle security issues in
the IoT.
• Inspired by existing Network Access Control and security techniques, we design a secure SDN-based architec-
ture for the IoT.
• Based on a Grid of Security paradigm23, we enhance security policies exchange and deployment between SDN
control domains.
Our security model is discussed later in this article, and we conclude with the outline of our vision for the SDN based
security on solutions for the IoT.
2. Software-Deﬁned Networking Architecture
Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN) emerged as a strategy to increase the functionality of the network, reducing
costs, reducing hardware complexity and enabling innovative research. SDN architecture models have three layers3,5:
an infrastructure layer consists of network devices (e.g., switches, routers, virtual switches, wireless access point), a
control layer consists of SDN controller(s) (e.g., Floodlight, Beacon, POX, NOX, MUL, Open daylight, etc.) and an
application layer that includes the applications for conﬁguring the SDN (e.g., Access control, traﬃc/security monitor-
ing, energy-eﬃcient networking, management of the network).
One important feature of SDN architecture is its ability to extends the security perimeter to the network access end
point devices (access switches, wireless access points, etc.), by setting up security policy rules to network devices7.
via the OpenFlow protocol, the SDN controller builds a global network view by establishing connection with the
OpenFlow switches.
In15,16,17,18, framework and security applications for SDN have been proposed by some authors. The main issue of
their works is the presence of a single point of failure with only one controller installed. Furthermore, security threats
are another drawback such as a Denial of Service (DoS). If an attacker compromises the SDN controller, then he has
full control over the network and this poses a potential risk to the entire network. Additionally, hardware and software
failures can occur with a single controller system. However, having multiple controllers19 provides trustworthiness
and fault tolerance. If one of the controllers goes down, another SDN controller can take control to avoid system
failure.
The Open Daylight Controller19 supports a Cluster-based High Availability model. There is increased network
performance with multiple controllers, because each controller has a partial view of the network, and the controllers
have to collaborate and exchange information with each other. The interaction between the Controller(s) and the
Open-Flow enabled switches is essentially to have one Openﬂow switch multi-homed to multiple controllers.
After version 1.2, Openﬂow includes two modes to interconnect multiple controllers in the network:
• Equal interaction: in this case all controllers have read/write access to the switch, which means they have to
synchronize in order not to step on each other’s feet.
• Master/Slave interaction: in this case there will be one master and multiple slaves (there could be still multiple
equals as well).
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3. SDN architecture for Ad-Hoc Network
The OpenDaylight Controller is set up by default on equal interaction. It has full access to the switch, and all
controllers have the same rules. Based on this approach, we propose Multiple SDN Controller architecture for Ad-
Hoc Networks. An SDN-based architecture involves the:
• legacy interfaces : the physical layer,
• programmable layer : SDN-compatible virtual switch and an SDN controller
• operating systems and their applications : the OS layer
All legacy interfaces are connected to a virtual switch, and this switch is controlled by an SDN controller, integrated
on the node. Since all controllers of each node operate in equal interaction, they will have no need to be concerned
about nodes liability for the misbehaving users connecting through them, as in13. Ad-Hoc users will connect with other
nodes through their embedded SDN-compatible switch. At the same time, the SDN controller, in equal interaction,
can enhance the security and connectivity between the nodes.
One of the advantages of this new SDN-based Ad-Hoc network architecture is its compatibility with SDN legacy
network. Since each node in the Ad-Hoc network has an embedded SDN-compatible switch and an SDN controller,
we can interconnect the Ad-Hoc network to the legacy network to construct an SDN-domain (Fig. a).
In a most recent work like12, the SDN domain is limited to the network with infrastructure. In this conﬁguration,
Ad-Hoc users have to connect through other nodes (Network gateway) directly connected to the SDN domain. In our
proposed architecture, the SDN domain is extended in order to include all Ad-Hoc devices. Our proposed solution
consists in deploying an OpenFlow software switch, such as Open vSwitch8 in each Ad-Hoc node. This conﬁguration
enables Ad-Hoc nodes to connect to the network as part of the SDN domain, so we can apply the same security rules
as for the SDN domain users. As show in (Fig. a), the proposed architecture supports networks with or without
infrastructure.
 
Fig. 1. (a) Domain-SDN; (b) SDN Domain interconnection - Extended SDN Domain.
As each Ad-Hoc node has its own SDN controller, the SDN control plane has to manage the evolution of each SDN
virtual switch on each Ad-Hoc device. When a new Ad-Hoc device connects itself or leaves the network, we can have
many exchanged messages in order to synchronize all the rules. In order to ensure scalability and fault tolerance, a
distributed SDN architecture is preferred, with multiple controllers as in13. To ensure that, we dynamically add new
controllers to the Ad-Hoc network area and authorize special nodes to run control operation. The new controllers
will share the same network global view. However, their functions and SDN management domain will be limited to
a small Ad-Hoc area. Furthermore those controllers will be responsible for monitoring the behavior of the software
switches, since they are deployed at the user side.
Our proposed distributed network access control architecture enables faster response to network changes. More-
over, it reacts to attacks occurring in the SDN domain, while sharing the traﬃc load management with the root
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controller. As mentioned earlier, control functions of Ad-Hoc controllers will be limited and adapted to the available
resources of the hosting Ad-Hoc device. We intend to extend the SDN domain even more, to include smart object
such as: tablets, smart phones, mobile vehicles, etc. by developing a framework that integrates OpenFlow software
switches into those devices.
4. SDN based architecture for IoT
The traditional network protocols and equipment are not designed to support high levels of scalability, high amounts
of traﬃc and mobility. Diogo et al. 20 have proposed an new architecture model for IoT. The authors argue about the
possibility of exploiting ETSIs M2M Architecture, by allowing the device to negotiate QOS and security parameters
with the Gateway. Also the authors discuss the idea of real-time conﬁguration of Cloud Service connectivity that
provide information about the device connected to it. It’s proposal is to have an interoperable, scalable and adaptable
IoT. Besides, there exist some papers25,26 of software-deﬁned approach for the IoT environment. These papers had the
focus of determining the integration of SDN and IoT, it’s do not propose a security mechanism. Our system proposed
a secure SDN-based architecture for IoT and Ad-hoc networks.
4.1. SDN Domain
In IoT or in sensor networks, each device cannot have an embedded SDN-compatible switch and an SDN controller
as we have proposed in the previous section. But, we can assume that each device, with low resource can be associated
to one neighbor node which has the SDN capability. In a heterogeneous network as in (Fig. a) we have two types of
nodes in a domain. If the node has enough resources, we called it an OF node, and if not, we called it a sensor or a
smart object. Each domain has its SDN controller which controls all traﬃc in its domain. The edge controller of the
SDN domain is in equal interaction, and all rules will be synchronized.
4.2. SDN Domain interconnection
In the proposed architecture with multiple SDN domains, we assume that in each domain, we have one SDN
controller or multiple SDN controllers. These controllers manage only the devices in its domain. A domain represents
an enterprise network or a datacenter.
An SDN-based architecture for the IoT requires heterogeneous interconnection with larger numbers of SDN do-
mains. In order to achieve such large scale interconnection, we introduce a new type of controller in each domain : the
root controller, that we can also call a Border controller. Some authors21,22 propose hierarchical architecture for SDN,
to optimize and distribute control functions. We propose not to distribute control functions on multiple controllers but
to distribute routing functions and security rules on each edge controller. Moreover these controllers are responsible
for establishing connections and exchanging information with other SDN border controllers (Fig. b).
The development of this architecture is based on the perspective of equal interaction between controllers, using
the existing security mechanisms. Each SDN domain has its own security policies and management strategy. To
solve potential problems raised by the heterogeneity of the security policies respective to the interconnected SDN
domains, we use the Grid of Security concept proposed by Flauzac et al. in23. The Grid of Security is a middleware
for decentralized enforcement of the network security.
5. Distributed SDN Security Solution
Many works have studied network security using the SDN architecture, either by implementing ﬁrewalls9,10,29,30,31,
IPS11, NAC7 and IDS modules24,27,28 on top of the SDN controller, or by installing security policies into OpenFlow
switches. The emergence of the next generation Internet architecture, requires even higher security levels, such as
authenticating network devices, users and objects connecting to users using both wired and wireless technologies.
Furthermore, we need to monitor the behavior of both the users and the objects, establish trust boundaries, and use
accounting methods along with software veriﬁcation. However, existing security mechanisms7,9,10,11 do not provide
these security levels to meet the security needs of next generation Internet architecture.
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Inspired by existing Network Access Control and security techniques13, we design an extended secure SDN-based
architecture for the IoT. To explain our architecture, we ﬁrst present a simple solution in which a controller manages
the security of one SDN domain. Second, we can extend this ﬁrst solution to include multiple controllers with regard
to the available resources on each control platform. In addition, we extend the distributed control architecture by
interconnecting all SDN domains via border controllers, which leads us close to a secure model for the IoT.
Traditional Ad-Hoc architecture does not provide network access control or global traﬃc monitoring, due to the
absence of the network infrastructure. The architecture proposed in this article overcomes those security limitations
and enables dynamic network conﬁguration and security policies deployment.
In order to secure network access and network resources, the SDN controllers begin by authenticating the network
devices. Once the device is authenticated, the controller will push the appropriate ﬂow entries to the software or the
hardware access switch.
The whole concept of the grid of security network is to extend the SDN domain concept to multiple domains (Fig.
2), and each controller of each domain exchanges its security rules with controllers of other domains. There are SDN
controllers which behave as security guards on the edge of the SDN Domain to ensure the network safety.
We have started to implement our solution with Opendaylight controller and LXC virtual machines connected to
an openvswitch.
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Fig. 2. Grid of Security in SDN Domain.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided an overview of a new SDN-based network architectures with distributed controllers.
Moreover, our solution can be used in the context of Ad-Hoc networks and IoT.
First, we presented a new architecture with multiple SDN controllers in equal interaction. Second, we proposed
an architecture which is scalable with multiple SDN domains. In each domain we can have networks with or without
infrastructure and each controller is responsible only for its domain. The communications between domains is made
with special controllers called Border Controllers. These edge Controllers have to work in a new distributed interaction
in order to guarantee the independence of each domain in case of failure. We adopt an architecture to guarantee the
security of the entire network with the concept of grid of security embedded in each controller to prevent attacks.
As future work, we will further study the characteristics of the extended SDN-Domain, investigate more security
mechanisms and explore the possibilities of employing them in the context of SDN. In addition, we plan to take
better advantage of the architectural framework of Opendaylight and test our system at an even larger scale in order
to optimize our system design. We shall work to build this architecture and test it in a real environments.
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